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Recent Developments
Davis v. State

I

n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that, in criminal
cases, an alibi witness's pretrial
silence regarding information that
could exculpate a defendant may
be used to impeach that witness at
trial.
More significantly, the
court's ruling in Davis v. State,
344 Md. 331, 686 A.2d 1083
(1996), established the foundations
necessary to allow an inquiry into
the impeachment evidence. This
decision creates a conditional
presumption of impaired credibility because of a witness's prior
silence and places upon a
defendant the burden of rehabilitating the witness's credibility.
The victim of an attempted
robbery identified Tyrone Davis,
("Davis") as the offender. Davis
pleaded not guilty and contended
that he never attempted to rob the
victim. Kabacca Bey ("Bey") took
the stand as an alibi witness for
Davis. Bey testified that Davis
was either with him or within his
view at the time that the officer
alleged Davis had committed the
attempted robbery. The prosecution, in an attempt to impeach Bey
for not previously informing the
authorities of this exculpatory
evidence, cross-examined him,
exposing that in fact he was not
with Davis at the time of the
robbery.
The Circuit Court for
Baltimore City found Davis guilty
of attempted robbery. Davis appealed the conviction. The Court
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of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the decision. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to determine whether the
trial court had correctly allowed
cross-examination of the witness
concerning his failure to inform
the authorities of exculpatory
evidence prior to the trial.
The court began its analysis by
reviewing the holdings of the
majority of the courts that have
considered whether prior silence
may be the basis for impeachment
of a witness's testimony at trial.
Davis, 344 Md. at 335-36, 686
A.2d at 1085. Those courts have
recognized that there are instances
when pretrial silence is relevant to
an alibi witness's credibility. Id.
If the "natural impulse" of the
witness would have been to inform
the authorities of eXCUlpatory
evidence, then the witness's failure
to report such information prior to
trial would be seen as a prior
inconsistent statement of that
witness. Id at 336-37,686 A.2d at
1085. In the event that a witness's
pretrial silence is seen as a prior
inconsistent statement, the use of
this silence as evidence for impeachment purposes would be

proper. Id
The court next faced the
dilemma of how to establish
whether this pretrial silence is
relevant to a witness's credibility.
Id at 338, 686 A.2d at 1086.
Although other courts have
established a list of foundational
~equirements that the prosecution
must meet, the court of appeals
established only limited requirements. Id at 343, 686 A.2d at
1089. In order for the prosecution
to be allowed to initiate an inquiry
into the impeachment evidence,
that party must preliminarily meet
one threshold requirement. Id at
338,686 A.2d at 1086.
The prosecution can meet that
requirement by laying a foundation
"that the natural response of the
witness, assuming the witness was
in possession of exculpatory
evidence, would have been to disclose that information to the proper
authorities." Id at 338, 686 A.2d
at 1086. Moreover, it is the trial
court's responsibility to conduct a
hearing to determine if there is
enough evidence presented by the
prosecution
through
direct
evidence or permissible through
inference to warrant an inquiry
into the witness's silence. Id
Once this requirement is met, the
prosecution then may crossexamine the witness regarding the
pretrial silence. Id at 346, 686
A.2d at 1090. The burden is thus
placed on the defendant to rebut
the prosecution's allegations and
rehabilitate the witness by explaining the reasons behind the silence.
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 65
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Id. Barring an absolute "abuse of
discretion" the trial court's determination that the proper foundation has been laid will not be
overturned. Id at 338,686 A.2d at
1086. After the foundation has
been laid and the silence is used as
evidence for impeachment, it is
ultimately the trier of fact who will
determine the credibility of the
witness's testimony." Id. at 33940, 686 A.2d at 1087.
The court of appeals next
applied its reasoning to the instant
case and affirmed Davis's conviction. Id. at 348-50, 686 A.2d at
1091-92. The court determined
that the prosecution had met its
burden of demonstrating a relationship between Davis and Bey,
and that because of this
relationship it would have been
natural for Bey to have informed
the authorities of exculpatory
information. Id. at 348-49, 686
A.2d at 1091. Based on its review
of the lower court's findings, the
court of appeals concluded that
Bey's pretrial silence constituted a
prior inconsistent statement, and
affirmed the prosecution's use of
this silence for impeachment
purposes. Id.
Although concUrring with the
decision in this case, Judge Raker
expressly
denounced
the
majority's premise and the
application of its newly established
test in the instant case. Id at 35051, 686 A.2d at 1092-93. Judge
Raker
disagreed
with the
majority's assumption that the
failure of an alibi witness to report
exculpatory information to the
authorities necessarily has pro27.2 U. Balt. L.F. 66

bative value in determining that
witness's credibility. Id. at 35051, 686 A.2d at 1092. She rejected
the test established by the majority
and instead urged the adoption of a
test used in other states. Id. at 35152,686 A.2d at 1093. In reconciling her concurrence with the
majority's holding, Judge Raker
reasoned that the error of allowing
the cross-examination had been
harmless, and thus warranted the
affirmation of Davis's conviction.
Id. at 350, 686 A.2d at 1092.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Eldridge vehemently rejected the
majority's rationale and asserted
that with the current distrust of
government and more specifically
the police, it is not surprising that
a potential witness would be
reluctant to contact the police with
any information. Id. at 353, 686
A.2d at 1094. Furthermore, Judge
Eldridge argued that the relationship between Davis and Bey had
been shown to be merely that of
acquaintances, and that it was very
unlikely that the natural response
of such an acquaintance would be
to go to the authorities. Id. at 355,
686 A.2d at 1095. Judge Eldridge
maintained that the use of such a
witness's reluctance against a
defendant would "create an unfair
presumption in favor of the state."
Id. at 357, 686 A.2d at 1095.
Judge Eldridge concluded that the
trial court had erred in allowing
the use of the witness's pretrial
silence for impeachment purposes.
Id. at 358,686 A.2d at 1096.
In Davis v. State, the court has
established the foundation that the
prosecution must lay in order to

conduct an inquiry into the reasons
for a witness's pretrial silence. By
establishing such a broad foundation, however, the court has
facilitated the State's ability to discredit alibi witnesses. All the
prosecution needs to show is that
the defendant and the witness are
mere acquaintances. Thus, the
burden placed on the defendant to
rebut this presumption of unreliability is an onerous one that
defense attorneys will have to face
head on.

